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I. Introduction 
In the relevant time period of this update, there were three Colorado 
Supreme Court cases, and one Colorado appellate court case, that 
significantly impact the oil and gas industry and the same are discussed in 
detail herein. Two such cases focus on permissible deductions: BP America 
Production Co. v. Colorado Department of Revenue1 discussed whether oil 
and gas companies may claim severance tax deductions for cost of capital 
associated with natural gas processing and transportation, and Lindauer v. 
Williams Production Rocky Mountain Company2 discussed whether lessees 
may deduct the costs of transporting gas to downstream markets from 
royalty payments. The two remaining cases pertain to local bans on 
hydraulic fracturing. City of Longmont v. Colorado Oil and Gas 
Association3 and City of Fort Collins v. Colorado Oil and Gas Association4 
are two companion cases that each discussed whether the Oil and Gas 
Conservation Act preempts local bans and moratoriums on hydraulic 
fracturing (referred to herein as “fracking”). Additionally, three other cases 
are briefly mentioned in the “Additional Case Summaries” subsection: 
                                                                                                             
 1. 2016 CO 23, 369 P.3d 281; see also Colorado, 1 Tex. A&M L. Rev. 129 (2014).  
 2. 2016 COA 39. 
 3. 2016 CO 29, 369 P.3d 573. 
 4. 2016 CO 28, 369 P.3d 586. 
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Rocky Mtn. Expl., Inc. v. Davis Graham and Stubbs LLP;5 Owens v. 
Tergeson;6 and Kinder Morgan CO2 Co., L.P. v. Motezuma County Board 
of Commissioners.7 
Six bills intended to materially affect the oil and gas industry were also 
proposed in the legislative session during the update period for this article. 
Of these six bills, only one was passed and it has no adverse effects on oil 
and gas operations. Specifically, Senate Bill 16-218 made certain 
amendments and additions to, inter alia, Colorado’s severance tax statute 
pertaining to refunds and the allocation of revenues held in certain funds.8 
Further, as a result of recommendations to the Governor made by 
Colorado’s Oil and Gas Task Force various regulatory updates occurred 
during the relevant update period. Pursuant to Recommendations #17 and 
#20, as discussed in further detail below, the 100, 300 and 600 Series of 
Rules for the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission were 
amended to “define Large Facilities within Urban Mitigation Areas 
(“UMA”), outline an enhanced local government consultation process when 
siting Large UMA facilities, and include registration with local 
governments to promote increased communication and advance planning.”9  
Lastly, four Ballot initiatives were proposed for inclusion on the 
November 2016 ballot that would adversely affect the oil and gas industry. 
But it now appears none of these Ballot initiatives, being #40, #63, #75 and 
#78, will actually appear on the November 2016 ballot;10 however, their 
key objectives are outlined herein.   
                                                                                                             
 5. 2016 COA 33 (“[A] petition for rehearing in the court of appeals or a petition for 
certiorari in the supreme court may be pending.”). 
 6. 2015 COA 164, 363 P.3d 826 (Colo.App. 2015). 
 7. No. 15SC595, 2016 WL 768449 (Colo. 2016). 
 8. S.B. 16-218, 70th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2016) (responding to the 
Supreme Court Ruling in BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Colo. Dep’t of Revenue).  
 9. COGCC Oil and Gas Task Force Rulemaking Summary, Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n., 
http://www.coga.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/COGCC-Oil-Gas-TF-Rulemaking-
Summary-Whitepaper.pdf. 
 10. Titles and petition formats were approved for Ballot Initiatives #40 (Local 
Governance), #63 (Right to Healthy Environment), #75 (Local Government Authority to 
Regulate Oil and Gas Development) and #78 (Mandatory Setback for Oil and Gas 
Development) during the spring of 2016. But signatures were only submitted to the Colorado 
Secretary of State on August 8, 2016, for Ballot Initiatives #75 and #78. On August 29, 
2016, the Colorado Secretary of State announced that, based on the required random 
sampling by state officials, it appears the required number of signatures have not been timely 
filed to place either Ballot Initiative #75 or #78 on the November ballot. Registered voters 
may challenge the Secretary of State’s determination by filing an action in Denver District 
Court on or before September 28, 2016. See 2015-2016 Proposed Initiatives, 
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II. Case Law 
A. Permissible Deductions 
Two cases were decided during this update period addressed what costs 
may be claimed as deductions (1) under Colorado’s severance tax statute 
and (2) from royalty payments due under an oil and gas lease. Both cases 
are discussed in detail below. 
1. Cost of Capital as Deduction under Severance Tax Statute 
In BP America Production Co. v. Colorado Department of Revenue, the 
Colorado Supreme Court considered the question of whether Colorado’s 
severance tax statute, codified at Colorado Revised Statutes (“C.R.S.”) § 
39-29-101, et. seq., permits the deduction of the “cost of capital” associated 
with natural gas transportation and processing facilities.11 The court 
ultimately found that the plain language of the statute unambiguously 
authorizes the deduction of such “cost of capital” and reversed the Court of 
Appeals’ holding.12 
Income that is generated from the extraction of non-renewable resources 
from the ground in Colorado is taxed under the above referenced statute. 
The severance tax statute permits taxpayers to deduct “‘any transportation, 
manufacturing, and processing costs borne by the taxpayer.”13 The goal of 
the severance tax is to tax the value of the resource at the time it is 
extracted, referred to as the “wellhead value.”14 Because resources are not 
sold at the wellhead, it is necessary to “look back and calculate a resource’s 
wellhead value after it has been processed, transported, and sold”; this look-
back calculation is generally known as the “netback approach” and results 
in the taxpayer being taxed only on the resource’s wellhead value rather 
than its full sale price.15 
“Cost of capital” is generally defined as “the amount of money that an 
investor could have earned on a different investment in a similar risk.”16 “In 
this case, the cost of capital is the amount of money that BP America 
Production Company’s (“BP”) predecessors could have earned had they 
                                                                                                             
http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/Initiatives/titleBoard.index.html (last visited Sept. 
1, 2016). 
 11. 2016 CO 23, ¶ 1, 369 P.3d 281, 282. 
 12. Id.¶ 2, 369 P.3d at 283. 
 13. Id. ¶ 2 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-29-102(3)(a)). 
 14. Id. ¶ 11, 369 P.3d at 284. 
 15. Id. ¶¶ 11-12, 369 P.3d at 284-85. 
 16. Id. ¶ 1, 369 P.3d at 282 (internal citation omitted). 
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invested in other ventures rather than in building transportation and 
processing facilities.”17 Specifically, such “cost of capital” is “the 
difference between the amount of cost recovery that the predecessors 
actually received from constructing the facilities, and the amount of cost 
recovery or deductions that the predecessors could have received if they 
had invested in existing facilities or paid a third party.”18 The actual amount 
of the BP’s “cost of capital” is not disputed as the parties stipulated to the 
amount; however, the issue on appeal was whether such amount qualifies as 
a “transportation, manufacturing and processing cost” under the severance 
tax statute.19 
In considering this question, the court reviewed the language of the 
statute to determine whether it is ambiguous and examined the meaning of 
“costs” under said statute and whether “cost of capital” is included therein. 
When interpreting a statute, the court’s goal is to give effect to the 
legislative intent by first giving the words used in the statute their “ordinary 
and commonly accepted meaning.”20 In the case of construing a tax statute, 
generally all doubts will be construed in favor of the taxpayer; however, 
“‘deductions and exemptions in taxation are recorded as a matter of 
legislative grace … and they are not allowed unless clearly provided 
for.’”21 The court found that Colorado’s severance tax statute is 
unambiguous in allowing the deduction of “all transportation, 
manufacturing and processing costs.”22 It distinguished many cases relied 
upon by the Court of Appeals in reaching its contrary decision by 
highlighting that such cases interpreted the term “cost” or “costs” on its 
own, without the preceding modifier of “any,” stating that “omitting the 
adjective ‘any’ changes the context of the word ‘costs’”23 and “‘when used 
as an adjective in a statute, the word ‘any’ means ‘all.’”24 
                                                                                                             
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. ¶ 23, 369 P.3d at 287. 
 19. Id. The District Court ruled that such cost of capital was a permissible deduction 
because the severance tax statute allows for the deduction of “any” costs, and absent 
language to the contrary, cost of capital is included within such parameters. The Court of 
Appeals reserved, finding that the severance tax statute was ambiguous as to the meaning of 
“costs,” and in the absence of express language from the legislature, costs of capital are not 
deductible. Id. at ¶¶ 6-7, 369 P.3d at 284-85. 
 20. Id. ¶ 15, 369 P.3d at 285. 
 21. Id. ¶ 15, 369 P.3d at 285(internal citations omitted). 
 22. Id. ¶ 18, 369 P.3d at 286 (emphasis added). 
 23. Id. ¶ 17, 369 P.3d at 286. 
 24. Id. ¶ 18, 369 P.3d at 286 (internal citations omitted). 
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The court also found that “cost of capital” was a covered “cost” under 
the severance tax statute. The Department’s argument that “the cost of 
capital is not an actual cost; instead, it is a mere ‘benefit forgone to pursue a 
different opportunity’”25 was rejected based upon the plain language of the 
statute.26 Additionally, the court identified other authorities which have 
determined that “cost of capital” is in fact a “cost.” For example, the tax 
statute governing oil and gas leaseholds states that the value of such lands is 
calculated by deducting “gathering, transportation, manufacturing and 
processing costs” pursuant to the administrator’s guidelines,27 and the 
guidelines established under that statute provide that “the cost of capital, 
identified as ‘return on investment,’ is a deductible cost in valuing oil and 
gas resources.”28 Additionally, “the Tenth Circuit has held that, absent a 
lease provision to the contrary, oil and gas lessees can deduct the cost of 
capital attributable to transportation facilities” from royalty payments.29 As 
a result of this holding, companies that own facilities used for 
manufacturing, transporting, and processing of oil and gas may deduct their 
“cost of capital” from severance taxes.  
2. Downstream Market Transportation Costs as Deduction from Royalty 
Payments 
The opinion in Lindauer v. Williams Production RMT Company30 
materially affects the oil and gas industry in Colorado. This case addressed 
two issues which were previously undecided in Colorado, framed by the 
court as follows: 
First, must costs incurred to transport natural gas to markets 
beyond the first commercial market “enhance” the value of that 
gas, such that the actual royalty revenues increase, in order to be 
deductible from royalty payments? Second, if the enhancement 
test applies to such transportation costs, must the enhancement, 
                                                                                                             
 25. Id. ¶ 24, 369 P.3d at 287. 
 26. Id. ¶ 25, 369 P.3d at 287. 
 27. Id. ¶ 26, 369 P.3d at 288 (citing to COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-7-101(1)(d)). 
 28. Id. (citing 3 Assessors’ Reference Library, § VI at 6.44 (rev. Jan. 2016)). 
 29. Id. ¶ 27, 369 P.3d at 288 (citing Atl. Richfield Co. v. Farm Credit Bank of Wichita, 
226 F.3d 1138, 1154 (10th Cir. 2000)). 
 30. 2016 COA 39 (“[A] petition for rehearing in the Court of Appeals or a petition for 
Certiorari in the Supreme Court may be pending.”). 
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and the reasonableness of the costs, be shown on a month by 
month basis?31 
The court answered the first question in the negative, and therefore, did 
not opine on the second.32 
This case involved a class action suit against WPX Energy Rocky 
Mountain, LLC (“WPX”), with plaintiffs being royalty owners under oil 
and gas leases covering lands in the Piceance Basin.33 Each of the 
plaintiff’s leases was silent as to the allocation of transportation costs.34 The 
parties stipulated that transportation costs incurred with moving the 
extracted resources from the wellhead to the point of sale (specifically, the 
“tailgate” of the processing plant) were not deducted from the royalties paid 
to the plaintiffs.35 WPX then incurred additional costs in transporting the 
processed gas from the tailgate to “downstream” markets where it was able 
to secure a higher price of sale.36 There were two components to WPX’s 
downstream transportation costs: (1) the “‘demand charge,’ which was a 
charge paid by WPX to reserve space in the mainline pipelines . . . paid by 
WPX whether or not it uses the pipeline to ship gas” and (2) the 
“‘commodity charge,’ which was paid by WPX per unit volume actually 
shipped on the pipeline.”37 WPX deducted the commodity charge from 
royalty payments in all instances; additionally, it deducted the demand 
charge only in months where gas was shipped.38  
Plaintiffs alleged that the deduction of any costs incurred beyond the first 
commercial market, i.e. both the demand charge and the commodity charge, 
was improper.39 Specifically, they argued that downstream transportation 
costs may only be deducted if it can be shown that “(1) the costs are 
reasonable and (2) the actual royalty revenues increase in proportion with 
the costs assessed against the royalties.”40 Here, the only element in dispute 
is the second prong of the Plaintiff’s purported test.41 Essentially, the 
plaintiffs asserted that a test known as the “enhancement test” applied to 
                                                                                                             
 31. Id. ¶ 1. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. ¶ 3. 
 34. Id. ¶ 8.  
 35. Id. ¶ 5. 
 36. Id. ¶ 6. 
 37. Id. ¶ 7. 
 38. Id. ¶ 9. 
 39. Id. ¶ 4. 
 40. Id.  
 41. Id. 
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this scenario, which test was first set out by the court in Garman v. Conoco, 
Inc.42 as follows: 
Upon obtaining a marketable product, any additional costs 
incurred to enhance the value of the marketable gas, such as 
those costs conceded by the [royalty owners], may be charged 
against nonworking interest owners. To the extent that certain 
processing costs enhance the value of an already marketable 
product the burden should be placed upon the lessee to show 
such costs are reasonable, and that actual royalty revenues 
increase in proportion to the costs assessed against the 
nonworking interest.43  
Additionally, the Plaintiffs contended that enhancement must be shown 
on a month-to-month basis through comparison of the price in the Piceance 
Basin to the price obtained in the downstream market.44 Conversely, WPX 
argued first, that the enhancement test did not apply to downstream market 
transportation costs, and second, if it did apply, then the determination of 
enhancement should be based upon the “prudent operator rule” and not a 
month-to-month comparison.45 Ultimately, the court agreed with WPX’s 
first argument.46 
The court considered the cases relied upon by the District Court, being 
Garman47 and Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co.,48 and found the same “do 
not require post-marketability transportation costs to meet the enhancement 
test,” and therefore, such costs “are deductible, if they are reasonable.” 49 
Furthermore, “lessees are not required to establish that such costs enhance 
the value of the gas or increase the royalty revenues.”50  
The rule in the Garman case was that all costs incurred by the lessee in 
making gas marketable must be borne entirely by the lessee and may not be 
deducted from royalty payments.51 The court in Lindauer noted that the 
                                                                                                             
 42. 886 P.2d 652 (Colo. 1994). 
 43. Lindauer, 2016 COA 39, ¶ 24 (quoting Garman, 886 P.2d at 661). 
 44. Id. ¶ 10. 
 45. Id. ¶ 11. 
 46. See id. ¶¶ 12-15 (finding that the enhancement test did apply to downstream market 
transportation costs and that such enhancement should be determined on a month to month 
comparison). 
 47. Garman v. Conoco, Inc., 886 P.2d 652 (Colo. 1994). 
 48. 29 P.3d 887 (Colo. 2001). 
 49. Lindauer, 2016 COA 39, ¶ 18. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. ¶ 21 (citing Garman, 886 P.2d at 659, 661). 
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Garman decision focused on the “implied covenant to market” that is 
contained in every oil and gas lease, specifically holding that “‘the implied 
covenant to market obligates the lessee to incur those post-production costs 
necessary to plate gas in a condition acceptable for market’ and that 
‘[o]verriding royalty interest owners are not obligated to share in these 
costs.’”52 Additionally, the court highlighted that the “enhancement test” as 
set forth in Garman was limited to “‘processing costs [that] enhance the 
value of an already marketable product.’”53 “Transportation costs” are not 
the same as, or included within the meaning of, “processing costs”; in fact, 
the royalty owners in the Garman case agreed that transportation costs were 
deductible without any enhancement requirement.54 Additionally, the next 
sentence in the Garman opinion specifically addressed “‘expenses incurred 
to process, transport, or compress already marketable gas’,” showing clear 
indication that the court treated such “transportation costs” separately from 
“processing costs.”55 Based upon the foregoing, the Lindauer court 
concluded that Garman did not apply the enhancement test to post-
marketability transportation costs.56 
The ruling of Garman was reaffirmed in Rogers, where the court found 
that in the context of a lease that is silent on the issue of permissible 
deductions, the lessee must bear all costs of marketability under the implied 
covenant to market.57 Specifically, the Rogers court phrased its summary of 
the Garman decision as follows: “‘We also determined [in Garman] … that 
in those circumstances where the gas was marketable, and subsequent 
production costs were incurred to enhance the value of the already 
marketable gas, such subsequent costs may be shared by the lessors and 
lessees provided that certain conditions are met’,” the referenced conditions 
being both prongs of the enhancement test (i.e. reasonableness and 
increased revenues).58 Performing a similar analysis, the Lindauer court 
noted that the Rogers decision did not apply generally to all post-
marketability costs, but rather only to “production costs,”59 and further 
noted that there was no indication that such “production costs” were 
intended to have a contrary meaning to those costs identified in Garman, 
                                                                                                             
 52. Id. (citing Garman, 886 P.2d at 659). 
 53. Id. ¶ 27 (citing Garman, 886 P.2d at 661). 
 54. Id. ¶ 28. 
 55. Id. ¶ 29. 
 56. Id. ¶ 30. 
 57. Id. ¶ 31. 
 58. Id. (citing Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 29 P.3d 887 (Colo. 2001)). 
 59. Id. ¶ 32. 
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“namely, ‘certain processing costs’ that enhance the value of the marketable 
gas.”60 It likewise found that the Rogers court later specifically addressed 
transportation costs.61 Significantly, the language applicable to 
transportation costs in the Rogers case provided that the same would be 
deductible from royalty payments so long as the costs were reasonable; 
proof of increase of royalty revenues was not referenced.62 According to the 
above, the Lindauer court concluded that Rogers does not mandate the 
application of the enhancement test to post-marketability transportation 
costs, but instead requires only that such transportation costs be 
reasonable.63 
Apart from distinguishing the Garman and Rogers cases as explained 
above, the court also identified several other factors that weigh against 
requiring transportation costs to meet the enhancement test. First, imposing 
an enhancement requirement on downstream transportation costs “ignores 
the ‘commercial realities of the marketplace’.”64 Second, the enhancement 
test “fails to take into account the long-term nature of decisions to market 
gas downstream,” such as entering into long-term transportation contracts.65 
Third, requiring operators to prove that a downstream market would 
enhance the value of the gas prior to deducting such costs “could 
discourage them from pursuing a downstream marketing strategy” that 
would ultimately benefit both lessor and lessee.66 Because the plaintiffs in 
this case conceded that WPX’s downstream transportation costs were 
reasonable, the court found that such costs were deductible from royalty 
payments;67 “transportation costs beyond the first commercial market need 
not enhance the value of the gas . . . to be deductible from royalty 
payments.”68 
                                                                                                             
 60. Id. ¶¶ 32-33. 
 61. Id. ¶ 34. 
 62. Id. ¶ 34 (quoting Rogers, 29 P.3d at 906) (“Once a product is marketable, however, 
additional costs incurred to either improve the product, or transport the product, are to be 
shared proportionately by the lessor and lessee. All costs must be reasonable.”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 63. Id. ¶ 40.  
 64. Id. ¶ 40 (quoting Rogers, 29. P.3d at 905). 
 65. Id. ¶ 46 (noting that “a month by month enhancement requirement is inconsistent 
with the long-term nature of the downstream marketing strategy and its long-term benefits”).  
 66. Id. ¶ 48 (finding such a rule would allow lessors to have a “‘free ride’,” enjoying the 
long-term benefits of downstream markets without paying their proportionate share of the 
costs). 
 67. Id. ¶ 54. 
 68. Id. ¶ 53. 
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B. Local Bans on Hydraulic Fracturing 
In both City of Longmont69 and City of Fort Collins,70 the Colorado Oil 
and Gas Association (“COGA”) brought suit against the respective home-
rule cities and sought injunctions against enforcement of each city’s 
regulations relating to bans on fracking.71 While the arguments put forth 
were slightly different, the court applied the same rationale and reached the 
same conclusion in each case. The portions of the court’s analysis which 
are common to both cases are discussed herein, with the specifics of each 
city’s ordinance and case-specific items being discussed in more details 
under the two subsections below. 
The majority of the court’s analysis in determining whether local 
governments were permitted to regulate fracking revolved around 
Colorado’s law of preemption. First, the court noted that the state 
Constitution recognizes the sovereignty of home-rule cities, quoting the 
following language: 
The people of each city or town of this state … are hereby vested 
with, and they shall always have, power to make, amend, add to 
or replace the charter of said city or town, which shall be its 
organic law and extend to all its local and municipal matters. 
Such charter and ordinances made pursuant thereto in such 
matters shall supersede within the territorial limits and other 
jurisdiction of said city or town any law of the state in conflict 
therewith.72 
Thus, a home-rule ordinance will supersede a conflicting state statute in 
a matter purely of local concern.73 If, however, the subject matter is of 
purely state, or mixed state and local, concern, the state law will supersede 
a conflicting home-rule ordinance.74 If no conflict exists between the state 
and local law, then both may coexist.75 
                                                                                                             
 69. 2016 CO 29, 369 P.3d 573. 
 70. 2016 CO 28, 369 P.3d 586. 
 71. Id.; City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29. 
 72. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 16, 369 P.3d at 579; City of Fort Collins, 2016 CO 
29, ¶ 12, 369 P.3d at 591. 
 73. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 17, 369 P.3d at 579; City of Fort Collins, 2016 CO 
29, ¶ 13, 369 P.3d at 591. 
 74. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 18 369 P.3d at 579; City of Fort Collins, 2016 CO 
29, ¶ 14, 369 P.3d at 591. 
 75. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 18; City of Fort Collins, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 14, 369 
P.3d at 591. 
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The first inquiry in a preemption analysis is whether the subject matter of 
the relevant home-rule ordinance “involves a matter of statewide, local, or 
mixed state and local concern.”76 The “‘relative interests of the state and the 
municipality in regulating the particular issue’” must be considered “on a 
case-by-case basis considering the totality of the circumstances” when 
making this determination.77 Additionally, the following factors, inter alia, 
should guide the court’s inquiry: “(1) the need for statewide uniformity of 
regulation, (2) the extraterritorial impact of the local regulation, (3) whether 
the state or local governments have traditionally regulated the matter, and 
(4) whether the Colorado Constitution specifically commits the matter to 
either state or local regulation.”78 In applying the above analysis, the court 
concluded that the home-rule cities’ regulations seeking to regulate fracking 
involved a matter of mixed state and local concern because it implicates the 
need for uniform statewide regulation and the extraterritorial impact of a 
fracking ban, on the one hand, and the local government’s traditional 
authority to exercise its zoning authority over land where oil and gas 
development occurs, on the other.”79 
When a local ordinance touches a matter of statewide concern, the next 
inquiry is whether such ordinance conflicts with state law; if such conflict 
exists, the state law will preempt the local ordinance.80 Preemption may 
occur in one of three ways: express, implied, or operational conflict. 81 
Express and implied preemption are “‘primarily matters of statutory 
interpretation’.”82 Express preemption occurs when the legislature “clearly 
and unequivocally states its intent to prohibit a local government from 
exercising its authority over the subject matter at issue.”83 Implied 
preemption occurs when there is evidence of “legislative intent to 
                                                                                                             
 76. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 19, 369 P.3d at 579 (internal citations omitted); 
City of Fort Collins, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 15, 369 P.3d at 591. (internal citations omitted). 
 77. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 20, 369 P.3d at 580 (internal citations omitted). 
 78. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 20; City of Fort Collins, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 15, 369 
P.3d at 591. 
 79. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶¶ 21-31, 369 P.3d at 580-81; City of Fort Collins, 
2016 CO 29, ¶ 16, 369 P.3d at 591. 
 80. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 32, 369 P.3d at 581; City of Fort Collins, 2016 CO 
29, ¶ 17, 369 P.3d at 591. 
 81. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 33, 369 P.3d at 582; City of Fort Collins, 2016 CO 
29, ¶ 18, 369 P.3d at 591. 
 82. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 33; City of Fort Collins, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 18, 369 
P.3d at 591. 
 83. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 34, 369 P.3d at 582 (internal citations omitted); 
City of Fort Collins, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 19, 369 P.3d at 592 (internal citations omitted). 
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completely occupy a given field by reason of a dominant state interest.”84 In 
ascertaining whether such intent exists, the language of the statute, together 
with the scope of purpose of the statutory scheme, must be considered.85 
Finally, the court acknowledged that in prior cases they had articulated 
different standards to determine whether a conflict by operational law 
exists,86 but clarified in these cases that preemption by operational conflict 
exists when “the effectuation of a local interest would materially impede or 
destroy a state interest.”87 The court further explained that such an analysis 
requires assessment of “the interplay between the state and local regulatory 
schemes,” which generally will involve “a facial evaluation of the 
respective statutory and regulatory schemes, not a factual inquiry as to the 
effect of those schemes ‘on the ground.’”88 
None of the parties in either case alleged that state law expressly 
preempted local governments from regulating oil and gas development or 
fracking.89 In both cases, the court disagreed with COGA’s assertion that 
Colorado’s Oil and Gas Conservation Act (“Act”) impliedly preempted the 
home-rule regulations at issue, stating that “[t]o the contrary, the General 
Assembly has recognized the propriety of local land-use ordinances that 
relate to oil and gas development.”90 Thus, the question of whether 
preemption existed here turned on whether there was operational conflict 
between the home-rule regulation and the Act.91 
The state’s interest in oil and gas development, and the legislature’s 
intent in enacting the Act, is explicitly stated as follows: 
                                                                                                             
 84. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 35, 369 P.3d at 582 (internal citations omitted); 
City of Fort Collins, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 20, 369 P.3d at 592 (internal citations omitted). 
 85. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 35, 369 P.3d at 582; City of Fort Collins, 2016 CO 
29, ¶ 20, 369 P.3d at 592. (finding mere enactment of a statute addressing certain activities is 
insufficient to infer the intent required for implied preemption); City of Fort Collins, 2016 
CO 29, ¶ 20, 369 P.3d at 592. 
 86. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 16, 369 P.3d at 582. 
 87. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 42, 369 P.3d at 583; City of Fort Collins, 2016 CO 
29, ¶ 21, 369 P.3d at 592. 
 88. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 42, 369 P.3d at 583; City of Fort Collins, 2016 CO 
29, ¶ 21, 369 P.3d at 592. 
 89. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 44, 369 P.3d at 583; City of Fort Collins, 2016 CO 
29, ¶ 23, 369 P.3d at 592. 
 90. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 46, 369 P.3d at 583; City of Fort Collins, 2016 CO 
29, ¶ 25, 369 P.3d at 592. See City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶¶ 45-47, 369 P.3d at 583-84, 
for a more detailed discussion of whether implied preemption exists. 
 91. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 48, 369 P.3d at 584; City of Fort Collins, 2016 CO 
29, ¶ 26, 369 P.3d at 592. 
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It is the intent and purpose of this article to permit each oil and 
gas pool in Colorado to produce up to its maximum efficient rate 
of production, subject to the prevention of waste, consistent with 
the protection of public health, safety, and welfare, including 
protection of the coequal and correlative rights of the owners and 
producers of a common source of oil and gas, so that each 
common owner and producer may obtain a just and equitable 
share of production therefrom.92 
Under the Act’s authority, the Colorado Oil and Gas Commission 
(“COGCC”) promulgates rules, regulations and orders covering a number 
of topics, including “the ‘drilling, producing, and plugging of wells and all 
other operations for the production of oil or gas,’ the ‘shooting and 
chemical treatment of wells,’ and the spacing of wells”93 for the purpose of 
preventing waste and conserving oil and gas resources while protecting the 
public health, safety and welfare.94 Ultimately, the court held in each case 
that the Act and the COGCC’s rules and regulations evidenced a strong 
state interest and control over numerous aspects of fracking and that each 
respective local regulation “materially impedes the effectuation of the 
state’s interest.”95 
1. Longmont  
In 2012, the residents of Longmont voted to add Article XVI to 
Longmont’s home-rule charter, providing as follows: 
It shall hereby be the policy of the City of Longmont that it is 
prohibited to use hydraulic fracturing to extract oil, gas, or other 
hydrocarbons within the City of Longmont. In addition, within 
the City of Longmont, it is prohibited to store in open pits or 
dispose of solid or liquid wastes created in connection with the 
                                                                                                             
 92. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 50, 369 P.3d at 584 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 
34-60-102(1)(b) (2015)); City of Fort Collins, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 27, 369 P.3d at 593 (quoting 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-102(1)(b) (2015)). 
 93. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 51, 369 P.3d at 584 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 
34-60-105(1);34-60-106(2)(a)-(c) (2015)); City of Fort Collins, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 28, 369 P.3d 
at 592 (citing C.R.S. §§ 34-60-105(1) and 34-60-106(2)(a)-(c) (2015)). 
 94. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 52, 369 P.3d at 584 (internal citations omitted); 
City of Fort Collins, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 29, 369 P.3d at 592 (internal citations omitted). 
 95. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 53, 369 P.3d at 585; City of Fort Collins, 2016 CO 
29, ¶¶ 29-30, 369 P.3d at 592. 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol2/iss3/4
2016] Colorado 153 
 
 
hydraulic fracturing process, including but not limited to 
flowback or produced wastewater and brine.96 
COGA sued Longmont, seeking a permanent injunction enjoining, and a 
declaratory judgment invalidating, Article XVI.97 The District Court 
granted both motions but stayed its order, pending appeal; Longmont 
residents and citizen intervenors appealed and the case was thereafter 
transferred to the Colorado Supreme Court.98 Specifically, Longmont 
argued on appeal that the District Court’s preemption analysis was in error, 
and that “the inalienable rights provision of the Colorado Constitution 
trumps any preemption analysis and requires [the court] to conclude that 
Article XVI supersedes state law.”99 
As discussed hereinabove, the court agreed with the District Court’s 
analysis that the state law in fact preempted the local charter due to 
operational conflict. In addition, the court was not persuaded by the 
citizens’ inalienable rights proposition.100 The “inalienable rights” provision 
of the Colorado Constitution is found in Article II, Section 3, and reads as 
follows: “All persons have certain natural, essential and inalienable rights, 
among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their 
lives and liberties; of acquiring, possessing and protecting property; and of 
seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness.”101 Under the proffered 
reading of this provision, “no local regulation alleged to concern life, 
liberty, property, safety, or happiness could ever be preempted, and thus, 
such local regulations would always supersede state law. Such a result 
would arguably render the home-rule provision of our constitution, art. XX, 
§ 6, unnecessary, and we cannot countenance such a result.”102 The court 
made reference to certain Pennsylvania precedent and an amendment to 
their constitution which established a public trust doctrine, but explained 
that no such constitutional provision or doctrine existed in Colorado. 103 
Additionally, the court also noted that the citizens conceded that there is no 
authority in Colorado to support the application of the inalienable rights 
provision of the constitution to the preemption analysis.104  
                                                                                                             
 96. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 4, 369 P.3d at 577. 
 97. Id. ¶ 5, 369 P.3d at 577. 
 98. Id. ¶¶ 6-7, 369 P.3d at 577. 
 99. Id. ¶ 7, 369 P.3d at 577. 
 100. Id. ¶ 57, 369 P.3d at 585. 
 101. Id. ¶ 58, 369 P.3d at 577 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 102. Id. ¶ 59, 369 P.3d at 586. 
 103. Id. ¶¶ 60-62, 369 P.3d at 586. 
 104. Id. ¶ 58, 369P.3d at 586. 
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2. Fort Collins 
In 2013, the residents of Fort Collins voted in favor of the following 
citizen-initiated ordinance: 
An ordinance placing a moratorium on hydraulic fracturing and 
the storage of its waste products within the City of Fort Collins 
or on lands under its jurisdiction for a period of five years, 
without exemption, in order to fully study the impacts of this 
process on property values and human health, which moratorium 
can be lifted upon a ballot measure approved by the people of 
the City of Fort Collins and which shall apply retroactively as of 
the date this measure was found to have qualified for placement 
on the ballot.105 
The municipal code of Fort Collins was also amended to provide that 
“‘[t]he use of hydraulic fracturing to extract oil, gas or other hydrocarbons, 
and the storage in open pits of solid or liquid wastes and/or flowback 
created in connection with the hydraulic fracturing process, are prohibited 
within the City.’”106 COGA sued Fort Collins, seeking a permanent 
injunction enjoining, and a declaratory judgment invalidating, the aforesaid 
ordinance.107 The District Court granted COGA’s motions; Fort Collins 
residents and a number of other interested parties appealed and the case was 
thereafter transferred to the Colorado Supreme Court.108 Specifically, Fort 
Collins argued on appeal that the District Court’s preemption analysis was 
in error109 and that “a five-year moratorium is sufficiently different from a 
perpetual ban [and] that the former may be a valid exercise of zoning 
authority even if the latter constitutes a material impediment to the 
effectuation of the state’s interest.”110  
The District Court found that the state law impliedly preempted the local 
ordinance;111 the Supreme Court disagreed that the preemption was implied, 
but did find that that local ordinance was preempted by operational conflict 
as discussed in more detail above. In support of its second argument, Fort 
Collins asserted that fracking was a nonessential portion of production and 
that the moratorium was akin to a “temporary ‘time-out’,” which was 
                                                                                                             
 105. City of Fort Collins v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 2016 CO 28, ¶ 3, 369 P.3d 586, 589. 
 106. Id. ¶ 4, 369 P.3d at 589 (internal citations omitted). 
 107. Id. ¶ 5, 369 P.3d at 589. 
 108. Id. ¶¶ 6-7, 369 P.3d at 589. 
 109. Id. ¶ 7, 369 P.3d at 590. 
 110. Id. ¶ 31, 369 P.3d at 593. 
 111. Id. ¶ 6, 369 P.3d at 589-90. 
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permitted in Williams v. City of Central.112 The court addressed these 
assertions separately. First, it held that “even though it may be possible to 
produce oil and gas without fracking while the moratorium is in effect, the 
moratorium interferes with the many operators who have determined that 
fracking is necessary to ensure productive recovery.”113 The result of the 
foregoing was that the state’s goal of permitting maximum and efficient 
production of each oil and gas pool in Colorado was materially impeded. 114 
Second, the court was not persuaded that the length of the moratorium 
should have the local ordinance from preemption. In comparison to 
Williams,115 which discussed a 10-month moratorium, the moratorium at 
issue here was for five years; “we view such a lengthy moratorium as 
different in kind from a brief moratorium that is truly a ‘temporary time-
out.’”116 The court found Claridge House One, Inc. v. Borough of Verona 117 
to be more analogous, wherein a one-year moratorium on rental condos 
being converted into condominiums was preempted by state law because 
(1) the regulation did not regulate, but forbid, the practice, and (2) even 
though only for one year, the moratorium had a deleterious effect on a 
statewide program of regulation.118  
Highlighting that the moratorium at issue in Fort Collins is not merely a 
regulation, but a prohibition, the court held that the local ordinance likewise 
deleteriously affected a statewide program of regulation and impeded the 
goals of the state’s Act and its interest in fracking.119 It is important to note, 
however, that the court also specifically stated that “[w]e express no view 
as to the propriety of a moratorium of materially shorter duration.”120 
Consequently, if a local government attempts to enforce a moratorium that 
is shorter than the moratorium at issue in Fort Collins, it is unclear what 
result the court would reach if the same were to be challenged.121 
                                                                                                             
 112. Id. ¶ 32, 369 P.3d at 593 (citing Williams v. City of Central, 907 P.2d 701 (Colo. 
App. 1995)). 
 113. Id. ¶ 33, 369 P.3d at 593. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Williams v. City of Central, 907 P.2d 701 (Colo. App. 1995). 
 116. City of Fort Collins, 2016 CO 28, ¶ 35, 369 P.3d at 594.  
 117. 490 F. Supp. 706 (C.N.J. 1980, aff’d 633 F.2d 209 (3d Cir. 1980). 
 118. City of Fort Collins, 2016 CO 28, ¶ 36, 369 P.3d at 594. 
 119. Id. ¶ 37, 369 P.3d at 594. 
 120. Id. ¶ 40, 369 P.3d at 594. 
 121. Based upon the court’s persuasion by the one-year prohibition contained in Claridge 
House One, 490 F. Supp. 706, it appears likely that a moratorium affecting the oil and gas 
industry would need to be shorter than one year in length in order to possibly be upheld. 
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C. Additional Case Summaries 
Three additional cases which also affect the oil and gas industry are 
discussed briefly herein. First, in Rocky Mountain Exploration, Inc. v. 
Davis Graham & Stubbs LLP,122 the seller of certain oil and gas interests 
sued the law firm representing the buyer’s principal, alleging that they had 
engaged in misconduct such as conspiracy to use a strawman purchaser, 
aiding and abetting of breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference with 
business expectancy, and aiding and abetting fraud by failing to disclose 
that the buyer was acting as an agent for another undisclosed entity.123 The 
court upheld the lower court’s findings, inter alia, that the use of a 
strawman in the mineral acquisition was not fraudulent and that the seller 
did not state a claim that the law firm had a duty to disclose that it 
represented the undisclosed principal.124 Sellers also asserted that the 
creation of an area of mutual interest (“AMI”) in the purchase and sale 
agreement amounted to the creation of a joint venture between the parties; 
however, the court found that, based upon the plain language of the 
agreement, no joint venture existed (e.g. “. . . ‘It is not the intention of the 
parties to create, nor shall this agreement be construed as creating, a . . . 
joint venture . . . or to render the parties liable as partners, co-ventures, or 
principals . . . .’”).125 
Second, in Owens v. Tergeson,126 the court reaffirmed the validity of 
mineral reservations contained in habendum clauses of deeds. In dispute in 
this case was whether a mineral reservation referenced only in a habendum 
clause was effective since it was not included in the granting clause of the 
deed.127 Referencing rules of construction128 and precedent within the state, 
the court concluded that a reservation of interest set forth in the habendum 
clause was in fact valid (e.g. “[I]n most jurisdictions a clear and special 
designation of the particular estate conveyed, whether contained in the 
                                                                                                             
 122. 2016 COA 33 (“[A] petition for rehearing in the court of appeals or a petition for 
certiorari in the supreme court may be pending.”). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. ¶¶ 1, 4. 
 125. Id. ¶¶ 2, 42. 
 126. 2015 COA 164, 363 P.3d 826. 
 127. Id. ¶¶ 2-6, 363 P.3d at 828-829. 
 128. Some rules of construction referenced by the court include the terms as written in a 
deed must be given effect; ambiguities in reservations of oil and gas must favor the grantee; 
language in the deed must be construed in harmony with its plain and generally accepted 
meaning; the overall intend of the deed should control, etc. See id. ¶¶ 15-19, 363 P.3d at 
830-31. 
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granting or in the habendum clause, will prevail over conflicting but merely 
general or formal language of the opposite clause.”).129 The court also held 
that a specific person does not need to be identified in the reservation in 
order for the same to be valid as the reservation may be presumed to be 
unto the grantors. “[A]n unadorned reservation clause evidences an intent 
by the grantors to reserve for themselves the mineral rights in the land.”130 
Lastly, the Supreme Court of Colorado granted a writ of Certiorari in a 
case which may affect taxation of oil and gas. On February 29, 2016, the 
court granted certiorari in Kinder Morgan CO2 Co., L.P. v. Montezuma 
County Board of Commissioners,131 one issue for consideration being 
whether the lower court properly determined that House Bill 90-1018 
amended C.R.S. § 39-10-107(1) to allow retroactive assessment of property 
taxes on the value of oil and gas leaseholds which were omitted due to the 
underreporting of the selling price of the oil or gas, or quantity sold, 
therefrom.132 
III. Legislation 
A. Overview of Bills That Did Not Pass 
During the 2016 legislative session, six bills were introduced which 
affected the oil and gas industry. Four of these bills were submitted by the 
House of Representatives (“House”) and two of these bills were submitted 
by the Senate. Notably, only one bill, being Senate Bill 16-218, was signed 
by the Governor. The other five bills did not pass; however, a brief 
summary of each is provided below for informational purposes. 
First, House Bill 16-1310 concerned the liability for the conduct of oil 
and gas operation. This proposed bill would have amended the current 
governing relations between oil and gas operators and surface owners to 
“allow proof that the operator’s oil and gas operations harmed the surface 
owner’s use of the surface of the land, caused bodily injury to the surface 
owner or any person residing on the property of the surface owner, or 
damaged the surface owner’s property.”133 It also would have held 
                                                                                                             
 129. Id. ¶ 20, 363 P.3d at 830 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court also 
expressed the differences between the habendum clause and a warranty clause. See id. ¶¶ 24-
26, 363 P.3d at 832-33. 
 130. Id. ¶ 28, 363 P.3d at 833. 
 131. No. 15SC595, 2016 WL 768449 (Colo. 2016). 
 132. Id. 
 133. H.B. 16-1310, 70th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2016). 
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operators strictly liable if their conduct, including fracking, caused an 
earthquake that damaged property or injured a person.134  
Second, House Bill 16-1355 concerned the ability of local governments 
to exercise land use authority over oil and gas facilities used in oil and gas 
operations in a manner analogous to the siting of other industrial facilities. 
Specifically, it would have repealed the limitation that “local governments 
have so-called ‘House Bill 1041’ powers . . . only if the Colorado oil and 
gas conservation commission has identified a specific area for 
designation.”135 Additionally, it would have granted local governments the 
specific authority to regulate the siting of oil and gas facilities and specified 
that the COGCC’s authority to regulate oil and gas does not preempt local 
governments’ siting authority.136  
Third, House Bill 16-1430 concerned the implementation of the 
recommendation for an oil and gas task force regarding the sharing of oil 
and gas operators’ development plans with affected local governments. This 
bill proposed codification of the “essential elements” of one of the task 
force’s two recommendations by requiring operators to share their 
development plans with municipalities affected by their proposed 
operations.137 
Fourth, House Bill 16-1468 concerned costs that may be deducted by a 
taxpayer as transportation, manufacturing, and processing costs for 
purposes of calculating the net amount realized by the taxpayer for the sale 
of oil and gas. This proposed bill limited the costs that a taxpayer may 
deduct for the purpose of calculation excise tax on the severance of oil and 
gas to “the direct costs actually paid by the taxpayer for transporting, 
manufacturing, and processing,” rather than “any” costs borne by the 
taxpayer; it further provided that “any compression downstream of the 
meter or measurement point is deductible as a component of 
transportation.”138 
                                                                                                             
 134. Id. 
 135. H.B. 16-1355, 70th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo 2016). 
 136. Id.; but see II. CASE LAW, B. Local Bans on Hydraulic Fracturing above for a 
summary of two cases which reach the opposite conclusion of the proposals contained in this 
introduced bill, i.e. the state law preempted the local regulations. 
 137. H.B. 16-1430, 70th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo 2016) (“engrossed”); see IV. 
REGULATION herein for a discussion of the recommendations of the task force and the rules 
promulgated pursuant thereto. 
 138. H.B. 16-1468, 70th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2016); see BP America 
Production Co. v. Colorado Department of Revenue, 2016 CO 23, 369 P.3d 281, 2016 CO 
23 (Colo. 2016) (considering the unaltered language of that statute as discussed in II. CASE 
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Fifth, Senate Bill 16-129 proposed that the word “foster” be replaced 
with “administer” in the statute creating the oil and gas task force “so as to 
require neutral administration by the [COGCC] with respect to oversight of 
its oil and gas operations.”139 
B. Senate Bill 16-218 
Senate Bill 16-218, concerning matters related to state severance tax 
refunds, was signed by the Governor on June 10, 2016. Although this bill 
does not directly address the oil and gas industry, as seen in the discussion 
of BP America Production Co.140 hereinabove, oil and gas operators are 
impacted by severance taxes. Specifically, this bill added § 107.8 (Refunds) 
to the severance tax statute.141 This section requires the State Treasurer to 
set aside a certain portion of revenue generated from collection of 
severance tax for the payment of refunds; at the end of each month, any 
revenues not required for a refund shall be the total gross receipts realized 
available for allocation under § 108.142 If, prior to July 1, 2016, the amount 
in the reserve is less than the amount of refunds to be made from the 
reserve, the State Treasurer shall credit the reserve with proceeds from the 
collection of income tax in an amount equal to the amount of the deficit. 143 
Additionally, on or after July 1, 2016, but prior to July 1, 2017, the State 
Treasurer shall credit the reserve with income tax proceeds “in an amount 
equal to the amount by which the refunds for the tax imposed pursuant to 
this article that are made for a month exceed fifteen percent of the gross 
severance tax revenues for the same month”;144 this shall be done on a 
monthly basis.145 If there is insufficient revenue to be credited, the State 
Controller may authorize an advance, unlimited in amount, to the reserve 
for the purpose of refunds.146 
In addition to incorporating the above refund provisions, the bill also 
amended the date of repeal in § 39-29-108(2)(a)(II) (allocation of severance 
                                                                                                             
LAW, A. Permissible Deductions, 1. Cost of Capital as Deduction under Severance Tax 
Statute, above). 
 139. S.B. 16-129, 70th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2016).  
 140. BP America Production Co. v. Colorado Department of Revenue, 2016 CO 23, 369 
P.3d 281. 
 141. H.B. 16-218, 70th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2016). 
 142. Id.  
 143. Id.  
 144. Id.  
 145. Id.  
 146. Id.  
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tax revenues) from January 1, 2017 to July 1, 2017.147 Furthermore, the bill 
restricted funds in the severance tax perpetual base fund, codified in C.R.S. 
§ 39-29-109(2)(a)(XVII) as follows: 
Notwithstanding any provision of this paragraph (a) to the 
contrary, an amount equal to Nineteen Million One Hundred 
Thousand Dollars in the fund is restricted from being used for 
any purpose whatsoever, until such time as the Joint Budget 
Committee, by a majority vote, releases the restriction on some 
or all of the money.148 
A similar restriction was placed on the severance tax operational fund, in 
the amount of Ten Million Dollars,149 and the local government severance 
tax fund, in the amount of Forty-Eight Million Three Hundred Thousand 
Dollars.150 The bill also amended C.R.S. § 39-22-623(1)(b), pertaining to 
disposition of collections of income tax,151 and added C.R.S. § 24-75-
201.1(1)(d)(XVII), pertaining to the state’s use of general funds.152 
IV. Regulation153 
A. Overview of Recommendations from Oil and Gas Task Force 
On September 8, 2014, Governor John Hickenlooper issued Executive 
Order B 2014-005, creating the Task Force on State and Local Regulation 
of Oil and Gas Operations (hereinafter referred to as the “Task Force”). 154 
The objectives of the Task Force were numerous, focusing on how to 
reasonably and effectively balance land use issues while minimizing 
conflicts, protecting communities, and allowing access to private mineral 
rights.155 The Task Force was comprised of twenty-one members, six of 
whom represented the oil and gas, agricultural and home building 
                                                                                                             
 147. Id.  
 148. Id.  
 149. Id.  
 150. Id. (“It is the General Assembly’s intent that the restriction of money in the fund 
shall not affect the distributions made under paragraph (c) of subsection (1) of this section.”) 
 151. Id.  
 152. Id.  
 153. Any capitalized terms used but not defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed 
to them in the COGCC Rules. 
 154. State of Colorado, Office of the Governor, Executive Order B 2014 005, as 
amended by Executive Order B 2014 006. 
 155. See Oil and Gas Task Force, COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, 
http://dnr.state.co.us/OGTASKFORCE/Pages/home.aspx (last visited Sept. 20, 2016).  
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industries, six of whom represented local government and the conservation 
community, and seven of whom represented “a variety of interests.”156 The 
Task Force convened monthly from September, 2014 to February, 2015; a 
report of its recommendations and findings was due to the Governor no 
later than February 27, 2015, with recommendations regarding new or 
amended legislation requiring a two-thirds vote of approval.157 Ultimately, 
the Task Force submitted nine recommendations to the Governor, two of 
which (being Recommendations #17 and #20) required implementation via 
formal rulemaking procedures by the COGCC.158 Both of the aforesaid 
recommendations were implemented during the timeframe for this update, 
with new rules being adopted on January 25, 2016, published by the 
Secretary of State on February 25, 2016, and effective on March 16, 
2016.159  
The Final Report of the Task Force was submitted to the Governor on 
February 27, 2015.160 Such Final Report titles Recommendation #17 as 
follows: Recommendation to Facilitate Collaboration of Local 
Governments, Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission and 
Operators Relative to Oil and Gas Locations and Urban Planning.161 In 
summary, “Recommendation #17 calls for the COGCC to define and adopt 
a process for improved local government involvement during the COGCC 
permitting process for Applications to Drill (APD) concerning the location 
of large scale oil and gas facilities in Urban Mitigation Areas (UMA).”162 
Recommendation #20 was titled “Recommendation to Include Future Oil 
and Gas Drilling and Production Facilities in Existing Local 
Comprehensive Planning Processes.”163 In summary, “Recommendation 
#20 proposes that all operators would be required to register in the 
municipalities in which they have operations and provide information on 
their planned development and operations within those municipalities.”164 
                                                                                                             
 156. Executive Order B 2014 005 at III(A); Executive Order B 2014 006 at I. 
 157. Executive Order B 2014 005 at II(E) and IV. 
 158. COGCC Oil and Gas Task Force Rulemaking Summary, COGA, 
http://www.coga.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/COGCC-Oil-Gas-TF-Rulemaking-
Summary-Whitepaper.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2016). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Colorado Oil and Gas Task Force Final Report, COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF 
NATURAL RESOURCES, http://dnr.state.co.us/ogtaskforce/Documents/OilGasTaskForceFinal 
Report.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2016).  
 161. Id. at 5.  
 162. COGCC Oil and Gas Task Force Rulemaking Summary, supra. 
 163. Colorado Oil and Gas Task Force Final Report, supra, at 9. 
 164. COGCC Oil and Gas Task Force Rulemaking Summary, supra. 
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Both Recommendations #17 and #20 were unanimously approved by the 
Task Force members.165  
B. Implementation of Rules Pursuant to Recommendation #17 
The COGCC Rules implementing Recommendation #17 include 
additions and amendments to the 100, 300 and 600 Series of rules. 
Specifically, a definition of “Large UMA Facility” was added to the 100 
Series, meaning “any Oil and Gas Location proposed to be located in an 
Urban Mitigation Area and on which: (1) the operator proposes to drill 8 or 
more new wells; or (2) the cumulative new and existing on-site storage 
capacity for produced hydrocarbons exceeds 4,000 barrels.”166 Procedures 
for the notification of and consultation with local governments regarding 
Large UMA Facilities were added as Rule 305A. These procedures require 
operators proposing a Large UMA Facility to provide written notice of 
intent to construct the same (“Notice”) to the local government with land 
use authority over the proposed location and the Surface Owner of said 
lands not less than 90 days prior to initiating the Form 2A COGCC 
permitting process.167 Such Notice must include the following information: 
(1) A description and depiction of the proposed Oil and Gas 
Location and the planned facilities; 
(2) A description of the siting rationale for proposing to locate 
the facility within the Urban Mitigation Area, including a 
description of other sites considered and the reasons such 
alternate sites were rejected; and 
(3) An offer to consult with the local government with land use 
authority over the proposed location to seek agreement regarding 
siting the Large UMA Facility, considering alternative locations 
and potential best management practices.168 
In regard to consultation, the local government with land use authority 
over the proposed Large UMA Facility location has thirty days from receipt 
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of the Notice to accept the operator’s offer to consult.169 If such offer is 
accepted, the operator shall consult with the local government in good faith 
about the “siting of, and best management practices to be employed at, the 
proposed location.”170 Surface Owners who receive the Notice may also 
elect to participate in the consultation process so that their siting requests 
and concerns may be considered.171 Similarly, within thirty days of 
receiving the Notice, if the Surface Owner requests a meeting with the 
operator and Director regarding the siting of the proposed Large UMA 
Facility, the Director will schedule such meeting.172 The Director will also 
participate in the consultation process if either the operator or the local 
government so request.173 Notably, the rules do not prescribe any particular 
format for the consultation.174 
If an agreement as to the location of the Large UMA Facility is not 
reached through the consultation process, “the operator shall offer in 
writing to engage in mediation with the local government.”175 The local 
government is not required to accept such offer, but if it does so, the parties 
shall jointly select a mediator(s) and equally share the cost.176 The 
mediation should conclude within forty-five days of the election of 
mediators, unless the parties agree upon an extension of time.177 The 
Director, while not a party to the mediation, may provide technical 
assistance to the parties or the mediator if requested.178 
If an agreement is reached through the consultation process, or upon the 
occurrence of any of the following, the operator may submit its Form 2A to 
the COGCC: (1) the operator asserts the proposed Large UMA Facility is 
subject to an exception pursuant to Rule 305A.e.; (2) the local government 
waives the Rule 305A procedures in writing; (3) the local government fails 
to respond in writing within thirty days of receipt of Notice; or (4) at least 
ninety days have passed since the local government and operator engaged 
in the consultation process but have not reached an agreement.179 Any Form 
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2A that does not include documentation demonstrating compliance with 
Rule 305A will be rejected.180 
Exceptions to the Large UMA Facility notification and consultation 
process are outlined in Rule 305A.e. Specifically, said Rule provides that an 
operator is exempt from the Notice and consultation procedures described 
in Rule 305A.a.-d. in any of four circumstances. First, the local government 
may “opt out” of the notification and consultation process through written 
notification to the Director stating that it does not wish to receive Notices 
for proposed Large UMA Facilities in its jurisdiction.181 Second, the 
operator and local government may be parties to an existing agreement 
which covers the siting of proposed Large UMA Facilities; in this instance, 
the operator must submit a copy of the relevant agreement provisions with 
its Form 2A.182 Third, the proposed Large UMA Facility site is “within an 
approved site specific development plan (as defined in §24-68-102(4)(a), 
C.R.S., that establishes vested property rights as defined in §24-68-103, 
C.R.S.), and which expressly governs the location of Wells or Production 
Facilities on the surface estate.”183 If so, the operator must likewise submit 
a copy of the relevant portions of the plan and local government approval 
with its Form 2A.184 Fourth, the proposed location of the Large UMA 
Facility is “within acreage identified as an oil and gas operations area 
included in an approved ‘Application for Development’” as defined in 
C.R.S. § 24-65.5-101, et. seq.185 In regard to the third and fourth 
circumstances outlined above, the operator must likewise submit a copy of 
the relevant portions of the plan and local government approval with its 
Form 2A.186 Additionally, as to the second, third, and fourth circumstances, 
the Director may confer with the local government to determine whether 
the proposed Large UMA Facility is within the scope of the cited agreement 
or plan.187 If, after thirty days, the Director determines that the proposed 
Large UMA Facility is not within the scope of the same, the Form 2A will 
be rejected and the operator will be notified to otherwise comply with Rule 
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305A.a.-d.188 Finally, all Rule 604.c.(4) requirements apply to Large UMA 
Facilities, whether or not a particular Large UMA Facility is excepted from 
Rule 305A.a.-d. under Rule 305A.e.189 
Rule 604.c.(4) was added to the 600 Rules in the implementation of 
Recommendation #17. The objective of such Rule was that “Large UMA 
Facilities should be built as far as possible from existing building units and 
operated using the best available technology to avoid or minimize adverse 
impacts to adjoining land uses.”190 In order to achieve this objective, all 
Rule 604.c.(3) Exception Zone Setback mitigation measures are required 
for Large UMA Facilities, irrespective of whether the same are located in a 
Buffer Zone or an Exception Zone.191 Further, a Form 2A for a Large UMA 
Facility will not be approved until the Oil and Gas Location Assessment 
permit for the same incorporates best management practices addressing the 
following: 
i. Fire, explosion, chemical, and toxic emission hazards, 
including lightning strike hazards. 
ii. Fluid leak detection, repair, reporting, and record keeping for 
all above and below ground on-site fluid handling, storage, and 
transportation equipment. 
iii. Automated well shut-in control measures to prevent gas 
venting during emission control system failures or other upset 
conditions. 
iv. Zero flaring or venting of gas upon completion of flowback, 
excepting upset or emergency conditions, or with prior written 
approval from the Director for necessary maintenance 
operations. 
v. Storage tank pressure and fluid management. 
vi. Proppant dust control.192 
Moreover, “the Director may impose site-specific conditions of approval 
to ensure that anticipated impacts are mitigated to the maximum extent 
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achievable.”193 In determining whether such site-specific conditions of 
approval are necessary, the Director may consider a number of potential 
impacts, including but not limited to: noise, ground and surface water 
protection, visual impacts associated with the placement of wells or 
production of equipment, and remote stimulation operations.194 
C. Implementation of Rules Pursuant to Recommendation #20 
The COGCC Rules implementing Recommendation #20 include 
additions and amendments to the 300 and 600 Series of rules. Specifically, 
Rule 302.c requires operators, beginning on May 1, 2016, to register with 
local governments (municipal local jurisdiction and county)195 where it has 
an approved drilling unit or pending or approved Form 2 or Form 2A. 196 
The operator may “register” by following the registration process set up by 
the municipal local jurisdiction or county, or if there is not one, by 
delivering current copies of its Form 1 and Form 1A to the Local 
Government Designee (“LGD”), if applicable, or to the planning 
department if there is no LGD.197 An operator may also be requested to 
submit the following information to the municipal local jurisdiction and the 
COGCC’s Local Government Liaison (“LGL”): (a) a good faith estimate of 
the number of wells the operator intends to drill in the local jurisdiction 
over the next five years; (b) a map depicting the following items within the 
local jurisdiction: existing well sites and related facilities, approved sites or 
sites with a pending application under Form 2 or Form 2A, and sites 
identified as part of the current drilling schedule but for which applications 
have not yet been submitted; and (c) well estimates based upon information 
known at the time and reasonable business judgment.198 
Conforming changes to Rule 303.b.(3)K. were made in accordance with 
Rule 305A(f) as previously discussed herein.199 Processing times for 
approvals of Applications for Permit-to-Drill, Form 2s and, on an Oil and 
Gas Assessment, Form 2As were detailed under Rule 303.c. Such 
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processing time and procedures for hearings depend on whether the facility 
proposed is a Large UMA Facility.  
If the proposed facility is not a Large UMA Facility, the Director shall 
approve or deny such applications within 30 days of a determination that 
the application is complete.200 If the Director has not issued a decision 
within 75 days of such determination, an operator may request a hearing 
before the COGCC.201 Such hearing shall not be held until 20-days notice 
and newspaper notice are provided, unless after the newspaper notice all 
entitled waive the 20 day notice requirement).202 
If the proposed facility is a Large UMA Facility, and the same is 
consistent with a Comprehensive Drilling Plan, or a local government 
comprehensive plan that specifies locations for oil and gas facilities, the 
Director shall approve or deny such applications within 90 days of 
determination that the application is complete.203 An operator may request a 
hearing before the COGCC according to the following timeline: (1) if the 
Form 2A identifies that the operator and local government reached an 
agreement regarding the site of the proposed Large UMA Facility, the Form 
2A was excepted from the Rule 305A consultation process, or the local 
government waived the 305A procedures in writing or failed to timely 
respond, a hearing may be requested if the Director has not issued a 
decision with 90 days of determination that the application is complete; 204 
or (2) if the Form 2A indicates that the operator and local government had 
not reached an agreement regarding the site of the proposed Large UMA 
Facility, a hearing may be requested if the Director has not issued a 
decision with 120 days of determination that the application is complete. 205 
Such hearing shall not be held until 20-days notice and newspaper notice 
are provided, unless after the newspaper notice all entitled waive the 20 day 
notice requirement).206 
Additionally, pre-application notification procedures were implemented 
in Rule 305.a. similar to the procedures added under Rule 305A. With 
respect to Oil and Gas Locations proposed within an UMA or within the 
Buffer Zone Setback, an Operator must provide a notice of intent to 
conduct oil and gas operations (also “Notice”) not less than thirty days prior 
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to submitting a Form 2A to the Director.207 For Oil and Gas Locations 
within an UMA, the operator must provide Notice to the local government, 
either through the LGD or the planning department.208 Such Notice shall 
include “a general description of the proposed Oil and Gas Facilities, the 
anticipated date operations (by calendar quarter and year) will commence, 
and that an additional notice pursuant to Rule 305.c. will be sent by the 
Operator.”209 This Notice will “serve as an invitation to the local 
government to engage in discussions with the Operator regarding proposed 
operations and timing, local government jurisdiction requirements, and 
opportunities to collaborate regarding site development.”210 Notably, this 
Notice requirement does not apply if the local government received Notice 
and accepted the offer to consult with the operator pursuant to Rule 
305A.a.211  
In the case of a Large UMA Facility, the operator must notify any home-
rule or statutory city, town, territorial charter city, combined city and 
county, or county (known herein as “Proximate Local Governments” or 
“PGL”) within 1,000 feet of the proposed site.212 Such Notice shall be 
provided not less than forty-five days prior to submitting a Form 2A. 213 
Local governments may waive their right to receive this notice at any time 
when such waiver is given to the Director and the operator in writing. 214 
This Notice shall include the following information: “the operator’s contact 
information; a description of the location and a general description of the 
proposed Large UMA Facility; and state that the [PGL] may provide 
comments as provided in Rule 305.d.”215 If the PGL provides comments 
pertaining to “specific best management practices reasonably related to 
potential significant adverse impacts to public health, safety and welfare,” 
the Director shall respond to the same in writing.216 
Rule 305.d. identifies the comment period for Large UMA Facilities and 
non-Large UMA Facilities. The comment period for a Form 2 or Form 2A 
for an Oil and Gas Location that is not a Large UMA Facility is twenty 
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days from posting pursuant to Rule 305.b.217 For a Large UMA Facility, the 
comment period is forty days from posting.218 The Director may extend or 
re-open either comment period in his sole discretion for no more than 
twenty days.219 
Additional consultation with the Colorado Department of Public Health 
and Environment (“Department”) is also provided for in Rule 306.d.(1). 
The COGCC shall consult with the Department in three circumstances: (1) 
if the LGD requests the Department’s participation in the COGCC’s 
consideration of an application within fourteen days of notification pursuant 
to Rule 305;220 (2) if the operator seeks a variance from a provision of 
Rules 317B, 325, 603, 604, 608, 805, 900-Series or 1002.f, or consultation 
is otherwise permitted or required under those rules;221 or (3) the operator 
submits a Form 1A for a Large UMA Facility.222 
Finally, Rule 604.b.(1) allows the Director to grant an exception to the 
setback distance requirements provided in Rule 604 within a Designated 
Setback Location if a Well or Production Facility is proposed within an 
existing or approved Oil and Gas Location.223 The Director may grant such 
an exception if he determines that “alternative locations outside the 
applicable setback are technically or economically impracticable, mitigation 
measures imposed in the Form 2 or Form 2A will eliminate, minimize or 
mitigate noise, odors, light, dust, and similar nuisance conditions to the 
extend reasonably achievable; the operator has complied with the notice 
and consultation requirements of Rule 305A, if applicable; the proposed 
location complies with all other safety requirements of these Commission 
Rules; and (a) an existing or approved Oil and Gas Location is within the 
Designated Setback Location solely as a result of the adoption of Rule 
604.a., above, which established Designated Setback Locations, or (b) the 
Oil and Gas Location is within a Designated Setback Location solely as a 
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result of Building Units Constructed after the Oil and Gas Location was 
approved by the Director.”224 
V. Ballot Initiatives 
Section 1(1) of Article 5, the Colorado Constitution reserves to the 
people of Colorado “the power to propose laws and amendments to the 
constitution and to enact or reject them at the polls independent of the 
general assembly . . . .” As noted above, during 2016 voters submitted a 
number of proposed initiatives directed at oil and gas industry. Four of 
these initiatives advanced to the point of having titles set and the form of 
voter petitions approved. Each of these initiatives essentially proposed to 
overrule Colorado Supreme Court’s state preemption holdings in the City of 
Longmont and City of Fort Collins cases discussed above.   
Proposed Ballot Initiative #40 would have recognized “an inherent and 
inalienable right of local community self-government in each county, city, 
town and other municipality” to use “prohibitions and other means” to 
protect the health, safety and welfare of “natural persons” as opposed to 
corporations or other business entities.225 In contrast, proposed Ballot 
Initiative #63 would have empowered citizens, by pursuing lawsuits, and 
local governments, by enacting ordinances which would not have been 
preempted by contrary state laws, to seek to enforce the “inherent, 
indefeasible, and inalienable right” of natural persons “to a healthy 
environment.”226 The proponents of Ballot Initiatives #40 and #63 failed to 
return any signatures to the Colorado Secretary of State, so these measures 
will not be on the November 2016 ballot.227 
Ballot Initiative #75 proposed to expressly grant to local governments, 
“without risk of state preemption,” the authority “to prevent or mitigate 
detrimental impacts on public health, safety and welfare, and the 
environment” by imposing “restrictions on oil and gas development.”228 
Proposed Ballot Initiative #78 took a different approach. It would have 
required oil and gas wells and other facilities to be located at least 2,560 
feet from an “occupied structure or areas of special concern,” defined as 
“public and community drinking water sources, lakes, rivers, perennial or 
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intermittent streams, creeks, irrigation canals, riparian areas, playgrounds, 
permanent sports fields, amphitheaters, public parks and public open 
space.”229 On August 8, 2016, proponents of these measures submitted 
signatures to the Colorado Secretary of State in support of these two 
measures.230 On August 29, 2016, the Colorado Secretary of State 
announced that random sampling required by state law had revealed that 
these petitions had failed to garner the minimum number of signatures 
required to be placed on the November 2016 ballot.231 Voters have until 
September 28, 2016, within which to file a lawsuit in Denver District Court 
challenging the Colorado Secretary of State’s determination.232  
 
                                                                                                             
 229. Id. 
 230. Id.  
 231. Id.  
 232. Id.  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016
